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Background: The Chinese government has increased the funding for public health in 2009 and experimentally
applied a contract service policy (could be seen as a counterpart to family medicine) in 15 counties to promote
public health services in the rural areas in 2013. The contract service aimed to convert village doctors, who had
privately practiced for decades, into general practitioners under the government management, and better control
the rampant chronic diseases. This study made a rare attempt to assess the effectiveness of public health services
delivered under the contract service policy, explore the influencing mechanism and draw the implications for the
policy extension in the future.
Methods: Three pilot counties and a non-pilot one with heterogeneity in economic and health development
from east to west of China were selected by a purposive sampling method. The case study methods by document
collection, non-participant observation and interviews (including key informant interview and focus group interview)
with 84 health providers and 20 demanders in multiple level were applied in this study. A thematic approach was
used to compare diverse outcomes and analyze mechanism in the complex adaptive systems framework.
Results: Without sufficient incentives, the public health services were not conducted effectively, regardless of the
implementation of the contract policy. To appropriately increase the funding for public health by local finance and
properly allocate subsidy to village doctors was one of the most effective approaches to stimulate health providers
and demanders’ positivity and promote the policy implementation. County health bureaus acted as the most
crucial agents among the complex public health systems. Their mental models influenced by the compound and
various environments around them led to the diverse outcomes. If they could provide extra incentives and make
the contexts of the systems ripe enough for change, the health providers and demanders would be receptive to
the transition of the policy.
Conclusions: The innovative fund raising measures could be taken by relatively developed counties of China to
conduct public health services. Policymakers could take systems thinking as a useful tool to design plans and
predict the unintended outcomes during the process of public health reforms.
Keywords: Public health, Chronic disease control, Complex adaptive systems, Rural China, Contract service, Family
medicine, Multiple-case study* Correspondence: tian65216@hotmail.com
†Equal contributors
China Institute of Health, School of Social Development and Public Policy,
Beijing Normal University, 19 Xinjiekou Wai StreetHaidian District, Beijing
100875, China
© 2015 Zhou et al.; licensee BioMed Central. T
Commons Attribution License (http://creativec
reproduction in any medium, provided the or
Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.or
unless otherwise stated.his is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
Zhou et al. BMC Public Health  (2015) 15:199 Page 2 of 12Background
As a result of the post-1979 economic reform, the
Cooperative Medical Scheme in rural China began to
collapse without the financial support from the collective
economy [1]. As a result, more than 95% population lost
protection from any form of health insurance by the end
of the 1990's [2]. Previous studies showed that lack of
health insurance raised the number of rural households
living below the poverty line by 44%, since low-income
families had to cover high out-of-pocket medical costs by
themselves [3,4]. The barefoot doctors, called village doc-
tors after 1985, became unemployed in 1981 and the vil-
lage clinics were also privatized [5]. Consequently, the
village doctors began to charge patients for curative treat-
ment and sell drugs for profit, and shift their focus to lu-
crative medical services rather than preventative health
care [6,7]. However, the outbreak and epidemic of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 exposed the
real weakness of China’s public health system [8]. The gov-
ernment realized that the health status of 900 million rural
population had considerable impact on Chinese social sta-
bility and global health [9], and the fragmentary rural
health systems should be re-established to make a quick
response to public health emergencies [10]. Therefore, the
New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was launched
in 2003 and covered health insurance for the whole rural
population by the year 2010 [11].
However, the health status of China’s population had
greatly changed as the economics was dramatically de-
veloped over the last decade [12,13], which made the
rural health systems in revival too simplistic to deal with
[14]. According to the data from the third and fourth
China National Health Services Survey, Chinese adults
had worse health status in terms of prevalence of
chronic diseases in 2008 than that in 2003, particularly
hypertension, diabetes, heart disease and stroke. Previ-
ous study indicated that chronic diseases rate ratio of
rural residents was higher than that of urban residents
(the risk-adjusted RR is 1.20 to 1.05), especially for the
rural residents, who were over the age of 65 [15]. Rural
health systems were required to counter this new chal-
lenge in addition to prevention of infectious diseases. To
improve the public health care, the Ministry of Health
instituted eleven basic items of public health services in
2009, including the establishment of residents’ health
assessments, health education, health care of children,
maternity patients, elderly and patients suffering from
hypertension, type II diabetes and severe psychosis, vac-
cine inoculation and immunization, response to public
health emergencies and assistance in sanitary control
[16]. The government also promised to increase the
funding for public health annually, from ¥15 (US $2.5)
per capita in 2009 to ¥30 (US $4.9) per capita in 2013,
and ¥35 (US $5.7) in 2014 [17].County hospitals, township health centers (THCs) and
village clinics constitute the three-tiered health systems
in rural China. The basic public health services are
undertaken by THCs and village clinics. Specifically,
THCs are in charge of the organization work of the pub-
lic health services, and they can obtain 60% of the fund-
ing in accordance with the governmental regulation.
Meanwhile, THCs are responsible for the supervision
and guidance of the village doctors, and are in charge of
the allocation of the remaining 40% of the funding to vil-
lage doctors, based on the appraisement of their work
performance in providing public health services. In other
words, the funding distributed to village clinics is the
work performance related pay. Unfortunately, the public
health related measures have not promoted health pro-
viders to supply high-quality services [18], but frustrated
the village doctors’ work enthusiasm.
The study conducted in Hubei and Jiangxi provinces
showed that the remuneration related to public health
services could not offset village doctors’ efforts to the
burdensome and time-consuming work, so they still pri-
oritized more profitable medical services [19]. The study
in Changzhou County indicated that village doctors felt
difficult to provide all the required items of public health
services. Most village doctors (92.3%) complained about
the “low salary” and “lack of social security” [20]. Our
former study in five counties of China also [21] evinced
that only 41.3% of the village doctors had pension, and
the proportions varied from 2.3% to 83.3% among differ-
ent counties because the pension were supported by
local finance. Moreover, the scarcity and aging of the
village doctors was seriously impending and the incen-
tives for the doctor recruitment and retention were in
demand [18,22]. Hence, the Ministry of Health launched
contract service policy to further improve the rural pub-
lic health services in 2013 and experimentally imple-
mented it in 15 counties each in one province [23].
The contract service in rural areas can be seen as a
counterpart to family medicine which has become a
pervasive measure to deliver public health services in
countries all over the world [24-28]. After signing the
contract with families, the village doctors act as family
doctors and need to provide health protection and med-
ical care to the family members individually, although
most of them are not qualified general practitioners due
to they received their education below college level [21].
In fact, the contract service policy aims to construct a
closer relationship between rural residents and village
doctors, which can urge village doctors to improve the
efficacy of public health services, for example, the early
detection of diabetes and hypertension, and other
chronic diseases control [23]. On the other hand, village
doctors need to sign a contract with THCs and promise
to cooperate with them in public health. Village doctors
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them have been practicing privately for decades. The
Ministry of Health intends to impel local governments
to include village doctors into their administration and
provide them with social security and pension by local
finance via signing the contract, because the local gov-
ernments play crucial roles in delivering public health
under the decentralization of governmental power [29].
For one thing, decentralization has become a global-
ized policy in many countries whether rich or poor [30].
The Chinese local governments take charge of health fa-
cilities under their jurisdiction and always follow their
own ways to pass on policies from central government,
thus the amount and quality of public health care vary
vastly across the country [29]. For another thing, health
care administration is in the charge of at least 16 gov-
ernment agencies. The Ministry of Health is just one of
them in low status and mainly responsible for policy
making and services providing. Purse strings and the
personnel management are in the hand of the Ministry
of Finance and the Ministry of Human Resource and
Social Security respectively. To resolve the problems re-
lated to village doctors’ remuneration and social security
would only depend on the finance and administrative
capacity of local governments in China [31].
The Ministry of Health has decided to gradually ex-
tend the contract service to all rural areas in 2014, on
the basis of summarizing the experiences and lessons
from the fifteen pilot counties [32]. There are few stud-
ies on the evaluation of the diverse outcomes of public
health delivery from the contract service pilot sites. Fur-
thermore, the potential factors and mechanism such as
how the various contexts and the agents of health sys-
tems in different levels, for example the central and local
governments, rural health managers, village doctors and
patients, influenced the outcomes, need to be explored.
In recent years, health organizations and health reforms
have been progressively studied as complex adaptive sys-
tems (CASs) [33]. Particularly, a few scholars introduced
the concept of CASs into public health evaluation [34,35].
Although there is no real consensus in the definition of
CASs [36], it is well-regarded to use a ranging of accepted
characteristics of CASs as an analytic framework when an
innovative policy is applied in health systems [37].
This study summarized the experiences of public
health delivery from four counties, three of which were
the contract service pilot site, and the other one was
not. The CASs theory was applied as a concept frame-
work to better understand and analyze the outcomes
and influencing mechanism of the policy implementa-
tion, and the results might offer an approach for the
policymakers and executants to perfect their manage-
ment models and improve the efficiency of public health
services in the future.Key characteristics of complex adaptive systems
CASs are comprised of numerous agents who may be in-
dividuals or corporations. Their interactions and relation-
ships should be seen as the core to understand the
systems. Agents act on internal simple rules which may be
expressed as instincts, concepts or mental models. They
can learn from external environments and adapt to the
changes happened in systems. If the contexts around them
are ripe enough for changes, in other words, make them
feel that the new policy is acceptable, they will feed back
actively. Otherwise, they can autonomously oppose to any
requirement or just maintain the status quo no matter
what happens around them. Moreover, their behavior and
passive feedback will influence other agents and the sys-
tems. Agents are intelligent and self-organizing. Any con-
trol thinking of policy maker is short-sighted, because
agents can only be guided or stimulated by incentives ra-
ther than be coerced by dictations [38].
CASs is inherently nonlinear, meaning that small
changes can have large effects, while seemingly large
changes may have little influence on systems [39]. Mean-
while, agents interact in nonlinear fashion and cause
events to emerge, and render the whole systems being
greater and more complex than the sum of the agents.
Therefore, the outcomes derived from interaction and
feedback of the agents are unpredictable. Non-reversible
processes having similar inception yet lead to different
outcomes. For example, the central government imple-
ments an innovative policy in several provinces and
requires them to reach the same goal. However, the
different initial condition [40] and people’s distinctive
mental models may guide them to make their own
choices along the way, and finally shape different paths
and outcomes.
Context dependence is another phenomenon in CASs.
CASs are nested systems with fuzzy borders, meaning
that each system can be a subset for a bigger one and a
supra system for a smaller one, and agents there can ex-
change information cross-border [41]. Agents’ mental
models or other rules in their mind are influenced by
their history, culture, values, and norms even illogical or
incomprehensible when viewed by others. Likewise, the
transition of external environment have impact on
agents, and their actions inevitably create ripple effects.
As a result, complexity of the systems is generated from
the dynamic coevolution.
Methods
Qualitative case study methods are considered to be
suitable for CASs design because they focus on contexts
and processes as well as events [42,43]. They are also ap-
plicable to answer “how” and “why” questions related to
the occurrence of changes. In a multiple-case study, sev-
eral subjects can simultaneously be dealt with, and the
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tensive explanations of the issue, and bring people into a
more robust conclusion than investigating a single case
[44]. Therefore, the multiple-case study approach was
used to acquire the circumstantial and complex informa-
tion about the four study sites, which included three
parts: document collection, non-participant observation,
and interview with agents in multiple levels, from
November 2013 to July 2014.
Four counties in three provinces were purposely sam-
pled depending on their different levels of rural eco-
nomic and health development. In China, the eastern
coastal areas are most developed, the central areas are
developed rather more slowly, and the western moun-
tainous areas are the most undeveloped. The origin of
NCMS funding is threefold; it comes from the central
government, local governments and households. The
compensations from central finance are, of course, di-
rected towards the central and western areas [18]. The
financing level for NCMS of pilot counties B, C and D,
which belongs to three provinces, respectively, locating
in east coastline, midland and western mountainous area
(Table 1), gradually decreased. We intended to explore
the influence of different contexts on the outcomes of
public health delivery in the three pilot sites. County A,
with the most thriving health and the best economic
conditions, is a non-pilot site in the same province as
county B. It served as a control site to corroborate
whether contract policy had impact on effectiveness of
public health services. Based on this, two to four THCs
were selected from each county, taking into account the
geographical conditions and heterogeneity in health de-
velopment, by using the purposive sampling. Then, one
to three village clinics were selected from each town by
a convenience sampling method, and all village doctors
in each clinic were interviewed. Concurrently, patients
were also interviewed at their convenience when they
saw a doctor in the village clinics (Table 2).
Policy documents and reports from local health facil-
ities were collected to extract the information about
local management models and some general statistics.
The backgrounds of history, culture, population and
socio-economics were gathered from the county annals.Table 1 Background information of the four counties
County Geographic location Per capita GDP NCMS
County A Eastern area ¥131169 (US $21420) ¥650 (U
County B Eastern coastal area ¥67933 (US $11094) ¥430 (U
County C Central plain area ¥92725 (US $15142) ¥370 (U
County D Western mountainous area ¥12573 (US $2053) ¥300 (U
All the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) data come from the website of the National
country level was ¥41908 (US $6856) in 2013. NCMS per capita of national minimumNon-participant observation in village clinics was used
to understand how and when village doctors delivered
public health care. The semi-structured key informant
interview with 35 people, including the county health bur-
eau directors, the THC managers, and patients in village
clinics, was conducted. The total 69 village doctors were
interviewed in focus group in the clinic units (Table 2).
The interview aimed to explore major agents’ mental
models on public health and contract service policy, and
their interactions in the public health systems.
Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethical Review
Board of Beijing Normal University (BNU) [22]. Verbal
consent was taken from all interviewees instead of sign-
ing informed consent because of their misgivings about
information divulgence. Interviews, lasting for 30 to
60 min, were tape-recorded, transcribed verbatim and
typed into Microsoft Word Software without any note of
interviewees’ name and accurate address. Likewise, the
counties and the provinces they belonging to were an-
onymous, and quotations in results section just men-
tioned interviewee’s post.
The thematic analysis approach [45] was used to
openly code the data and generate inductive codes [46],
which allowed the raw data to be summarized by our
categories. Three different sources for data collection
helped in triangulating the findings [47]. Information
and data from documents could corroborate interviewees’
opinions. Observation and interview could detect informa-
tion in more aspects to avoid bias of overrated official
data. Moreover, interviewing people in different levels
could counter the bias derived from one-sided story.
We extracted concepts targeting patterns of unexpected
events, processes, contexts, relationships and interactions,
which were keys to understand the public health systems
as CASs [48]. These procedures allowed the authors to
identify the relationships among the concepts and ground
interpretation on the research questions.
Results and discussion
Diverse pathways and outcomes
The three pilot counties had already launched the con-
tract service policy for 8 to 12 months by the time we
carried out this study (Table 3). The local governmentsper rural capita Rural residents proportion Population served
by THCs visited
S $105) 61.67% 479748
S $70) 82.76% 161681
S $60) 48.99% 47414
S $48) 80.37% 83600
Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/. Per capita GDP on a
requirement was ¥350 (US $56) in 2013.
Table 2 Sampling techniques and sizes in different levels
Category Sampling technique County A County B County C County D
Director of county health bureau \ 1 1 1 1
Township health centers Purposive sampling 3 2 2 4
Village clinics Convenience sampling 6 6 4 5
Village doctors \ 30 21 6 12
Patients Convenience sampling 6 6 3 5
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different patterns and led to the divergent outcomes,
particularly in terms of the chronic diseases control.
In this study, county A did not implement contract
service policy. The organization of public health services
was rather slack. Little headway was made in health as-
sessments and chronic diseases control. To conduct all
public health items would consume gigantic amounts of
manpower and material resources of THCs, and the
funding for public health could not offset the operating
costs. In fact, they skimped the funding deserved by vil-
lage clinics and overlooked village doctors’ dereliction of
duty. A complete health assessment system should con-
tain physical examination and medical record of each
villager throughout the year, however, the health assess-
ment files in village clinics were not completed in nei-
ther quantity nor quality.
“Our clinic does not receive any funding for public
health. They (THC) asked us to establish health
assessments for 3,000 villagers, but we don’t have
enough workforces to do that. My two partners and I
are over the age of 50. It is laborious for us to input
the health data into computer because our computer
skills are really poor.” (Village doctor, county A)
For patients, all of them preferred to go to higher level
hospitals for examination and diagnosis of their diseases,
and only regarded village clinic as a pharmacy. After all,
village clinics had no equipment to measure blood
glucose and few doctors here were national licensed.
Villagers mistrusted their abilities of medical services.
Furthermore, patients were not familiar with the items




County A Not yet \
County B 12 months 13.30%
County C 12 months 50.00%
County D 8 months 84.97%
Physician per 1000 capita on country level was 2.04 in 2013 according to the data from trealize the importance of these work, because there was
few propaganda conducted by any health organization.
The THC managers indicated that only the elderly and
the seriously ill patients were willing to participate the
free physical examination once a year, health lectures
and the quarterly follow-up. As a result, there was not
sufficient data about villagers’ health status could be re-
corded in the health assessments. Few of chronic cases
were in the charge of the village clinics.
“The traffic is convenient now, and almost every
family possesses a car. We always go to THC and
county hospital to see a doctor. In the village clinic, we
only buy some drugs for slight illness such as a cold.”
(Villager, county A)
“For most villagers, preventive health care is not in
demand. They only see a doctor when they have fallen
ill. Thus, they are unwilling to cooperate with our
work.” (THC manager, county A)
In addition, the migrant population, who could not
participate in the health examination on schedule, was
also a factor of the uncompleted health assessments. .
The county health bureau director pointed out that the
migrant population may become the potential loophole
of the diseases prevention and control.
The director attributed the fail to three reasons. First,
public health funding and NCMS were managed at the
county level and there was not an internet connection
among the counties. For this reason, the migrants could
not enjoy health service out of their native home. Sec-
ond, although the ratio of physician per 1000 capita was




for a village doctor
Social security
2.99 ¥800 (US $131) Yes
2.20 ¥800 (US $131) Yes
2.72 ¥300 (US $49) Yes
1.60 Not yet Not yet
he website of the National Bureau of Statistics of China http://www.stats.gov.cn/.
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the director thought that the health workforce was in
shortage to accomplish all the public health items in high
quality. Finally, the funding for public health was insuffi-
cient to be shared by THCs and village clinics. Therefore,
health providers were lack of work enthusiasm when they
were asked to provide public health services.
County health bureau had taken several measures to
retain and recruit health workforce. They have insured
all village doctors with pension and other social security
since 2007, and launched the program about free educa-
tion for the medical students who signed to become vil-
lage doctors after their graduation. Two THCs even
recruited non- professionals to share village doctors’
workload. However, the effect of these measures could
not be seen in short term.
“The inflexibility of health funding and a large
migrant population are national-wide problems……the
workforce supplementing measures are slow remedies
that cannot meet the urgency nowadays.” (County
health bureau director, county A)
Director also took a gloomy view of the prospect of
the contract service policy. The contract, voluntarily
signed between village doctors and villagers, did not set
any limitation on demanders. Villagers would still follow
their inclinations to higher level hospitals, before the
medical service ability of village clinics was improved to
a more satisfactory level. Even if the THCs discharged
their duty on performance appraisal, village doctors
could not reach the standard such as a certain contract
signing rate or the completeness of health assessment
records in such a situation. Ultimately, they would forge
the data to obtain the funding.
“THCs’ assistance and supervision will be operative
to enhance village clinics’ service ability in a short
while, but now both of them think the potential
work is unrewarding. If the contract could not bring
village doctors sufficient income and assistance, it
is just a dead letter.” (County health bureau director,
county A)
Evidence from the pilot sites county C and D partially
verified the negative prediction of the health bureau
director in county A, but first to look at the bright
side. Following the instruction of superior government,
county health bureaus carried out the contract service as
an administrative task. The THCs signed contract with
village doctors and asked them to persuade villagers to
sign contract with village clinics. THCs mainly took
charge of health education, propaganda on public health,
and management of village clinics, such as to print anddisperse leaflets, train village doctors and appraise their
work performance. The public health awareness was at
least improved among villagers in the process of signing
the contract.
However, the contract signing rates in the household
units (Table 3) could not represent the effectiveness of
public health services. County health bureaus established
a supervision system, while the outcomes were counter-
productive. They required THCs to reach a certain rate
of filling in the health assessments. Thus, the THCs took
the rate as one of standards to assess village clinics. If
the village doctors could not hit the target rate, their
performance-related income will be deducted. Under the
circumstances, bogus data of health assessments was
spread all over the counties. Several THC managers
reflected this problem.
“Most village doctors are too old to adroitly operate a
computer. Even though they collected the data of
follow-up, they could not input them into computers
by the time of routine inspection. To avoid the
income deduction, they have to complete the health
assessments in a more prompt way.” (THC Manager,
county C)
“We need this target rate as our work achievement, so
we just open a blind eye on the bogus data.” (THC
Manager, county D)
Meanwhile, the effectiveness of chronic diseases con-
trol was not satisfactory neither. Although some village
clinics had the authentic information about patients who
suffered from hypertension and diabetes, they reported
that a large proportion of patients were reluctant to see
a doctor in the clinics because they were dissatisfied
with the medical conditions there.
“We are asked to remind the patients of follow-up by
telephone, or visit their home to obtain data such as
their blood pressure. However, except for the elderly
living alone and bed-ridden ones, patients with
chronic diseases always go to THC or county hospital
to see a doctor.” (Village doctor, county D)
Directors of the two counties health bureau reported
in one voice that most villagers were indifferent to con-
tract service even if they had signed the contract.
“The public health is financed by the government
rather than the residents’ out-of-pocket money. Thus,
they don’t care the free services. If they don’t trust the
village doctors’ ability, they will not come back to the
clinics for follow-up.” (County health bureau director,
county C)
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vices, health providers had grievances of their own. Most
of THC managers complained about their heavy work-
load, insufficient remuneration and workforce shortage
after the implementation of the contract service policy.
“We assigned the task of public health to the village
clinics and allocated them near 40% of the public
health funding after signing the contract. However, our
staff began to feel dissatisfied because the rest of
funding hardly offset the operating costs.” (THC
manager, county C)
“We constantly suffered from workforce shortage. It is
getting worse as we settle down to the genuine work of
public health services.” (THC manager, county D)
For village doctors, they were also lack of work incen-
tives because of the limited local financial investment.
The issue about their pension and social security were
not solved rightly, which was not commensurate with
the public health obligation imposed on them. Village
doctors in county D had no pension and social security.
The pension in county C was ¥300 (US $49) per month,
which barely met the minimum standard of living. Social
security there was just in initial stage (Table 3). Most vil-
lage clinics were still operated privately. Village doctors
had to commit themselves to providing fee-for-service
medical care, whereby they could afford their retirement
and indemnity in case of malpractice.
“Although we have signed a contract with THC, we
don’t receive social security as the THC staff. I feel
that the government still regards us as peasants rather
than doctors in public medical facilities.” (Village
doctor, county D)
The funding for public health brought them the sub-
sidy of ¥5,000 to ¥10,000 annually (varying with the ser-
vice population in different villages), approximately 13%
(county C) to 40% (county D) of their total annual income.
“If we are devoted to public health services, it will
occupy most of our working hours. It means that our
income will sharply decline.” (Village doctor, county C)
The reports submitted by the county health bureaus to
the Ministry of Health suggested that more public ex-
penditure should be invested to increase work incen-
tives, recruit workforce and cover social security for the
village doctors. Otherwise, the quality of public health
care could not be guaranteed.
Contrary to the experiences of the three counties above,
health bureau in county B resolved part of the problem bya distinctive funding raising method, and took an import-
ant step toward chronic diseases control. The contract
service there is a series of pre-paid package services di-
vided into different kinds of chronic diseases including
hypertension, diabetes, severe psychosis, chronic obstruct-
ive pulmonary disease, malignant tumor and disability.
The packages were also divided into high, middle and low
classes. Families could choose packages for their family
members depending on their types of illness and eco-
nomic status. The package contains some physical exam-
ination items and fee for certain kinds of drugs for one
year, extra to the free basic public health services. The
contracted villagers buy these packages by approximately
two-thirds of the original value, county health bureau will
complement the rest of the total expenditure of THCs and
village clinics by the NCMS funding.
Take the hypertension package in middle class as an
example, the contracted family pay ¥100 (US $16.4) for a
hypertensive family member (the original value is ¥150).
This patient enjoys test blood pressure once every
month (the original interval is once every three months),
which is much closer to the international standard of
hypertension control [49]; the proportion of the medical
charge reimbursement in the village clinics is increased
from 50% to 85% which is equal to that of THC; when
the village doctors puzzle over any intractable symptom
of the patient, they can ask THC cadres to help them
solve the problem during the THCs’ biweekly round of
visit. If a patient is in a more complex situation and will-
ing to pay an extra ¥30 (¥15 in it is out-of-pocket per
visit, the remaining is reimbursed out of NCMS), the vil-
lage doctors will apply for a long-distance teleconsulta-
tion from the specialists in the county hospital.
The upgraded contract service in a preferential price
spread rapidly among villagers, and many patients signed
the contract and participated in the public health ser-
vices actively.
“We don’t need to publicize the public health services
and remind patients of follow-up repeatedly. They al-
ways clearly remember the date and punctually go to
the clinics for follow-up.” (Village doctor, county B)
For contracted patients, they acknowledged that they
could resolve most of their problems in the village clinics.
“Last month, my blood glucose raised a lot. Village
doctors applied for a teleconsultation for me. The
specialist adjusted my drugs and solved my problem
through the video communication, meanwhile it saved me
time and the expense of travelling.” (Villager, county B)
According to the statistics collected in March 2014,
76.50% of the contracted families bought hypertension
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novative package services were experimentally imple-
mented in 30% village clinics, so the signing rate in county
level was just 13.30%. However, more than 90% patients
suffering from hypertension and diabetes in the pilot vil-
lages we visited, had been controlled by the village clinics,
according to the county health bureau’s report.
THCs took charge of and allocated the package fee as
a part of funding for public health. They did not take
signing rate as an appraisal standard and never required
the village doctors to visit patient home. They only
checked the health assessments with the follow-up re-
cords through the electronic information system and
phoned several patients randomly to authenticate the
data. The increase in income related to public health im-
proved THCs’ work incentives and prompted them to
help village clinics with their service quality. The village
clinics with enhanced ability shared THCs’ duty on pub-
lic health and reduced their workload. A virtuous cycle
was gradually shaping between them.
“We are willing to assist the village clinics and
allocate the funding they deserved, because they can
save our manpower and operating costs in public
health in the long run.” (THC manager, county B)
In terms of village clinics, package services increased
their funding for public health and the outpatient quantity.
The latter one extremely raised their income in registered
fee. Therefore, their income did not heavily decrease even
if they prioritized the public health services rather than
the medical services after the implementation of the con-
tract service. Their total income was, of course, less than
that of their previous private practice. However, the med-
ical liability insurance, pension and a full set of social se-
curity equal to the treatment of a village official, which
were financed by the county government, made them feel
that the loss was worthwhile.
“My previous income was one time more than the
income now. However, I had no insurance at that time.
Once I was involved into a tangle of medical
malpractice, I would dissipate my fortune and go
bankrupt overnight. Thus, I consider the status quo
better than before.” (Village doctor, county B)
Nevertheless, the county health bureau director and
most of THC managers were still puzzled by the migrant
population loophole and health workforce shortage.
Some village doctors were also anxious to sign more
contracts next year and asked for staffing up.
“Considering the discount price of the package services,
several families have already come to consult us aboutthe contract affairs next year. We have been really
busy, and need more workforce to control increasing
chronic cases, or we cannot guarantee the service
quality in the near future.” (Village doctor, county B)
Relationships and interactions between agents
There are a large number of agents with different inten-
tions and functions in the public health systems. The
central government makes a series of policies to pro-
mote the rural public health services. The provincial and
the municipal governments pass on the policies stepwise.
These three levels of governments can be regarded as a
corporate agent called policy level. The county health
bureaus are the authentic executants of public health in
the systems. Their decision-making leads to different
pathways and outcomes. They can provide financial sup-
port, manipulate NCMS and adjust the policies on their
own way. THCs and village clinics are health providers
who need to maintain their operation and income. If
there is no sufficient subsidy for their work, they would
rather choose to neglect their duty to avoid economic
loss. The rural residents have experienced several
rounds of health reforms since 1979. They will not trust
any health policy ever, unless they could really benefit
from it. They hope to enjoy health service in the neigh-
borhood. However, if the medical conditions in the vil-
lage clinics is not satisfactory, they would rather go to
THCs and hospitals in municipal level to find high-
quality service.
The successfulness of county B mainly stemmed from
positive interactions between several agents, which dem-
onstrated the complexity and adaptability of the policy
implementation process (Figure 1). First, the patients de-
cided to trust the government again for the sake of the
discount they could gain in the contract. Meanwhile,
the contract set a limitation on them, that is, if they did
not participate in the public health services, the package
fee they paid would be in vain. Next, county health
bureau provided a complete set of social security to vil-
lage doctors and delivered a knockout blow to the village
doctors’ self-financing practice model. Village doctors
genuinely came back to the government management
and placed emphasis on providing public health services.
Moreover, cooperative relationship has shaped be-
tween the THCs and village clinics. The income from
the registered fee in the village clinics and the package
fee depended on the demanders’ willingness to pay.
Hence, it was crucial for both the THCs and village
clinics to provide high-quality services and ensure the
contracted patients’ satisfaction. In addition, the package
fee did increase their work incentives to some degree. As a
result, the THCs stopped skimping on funding for public
health, and began to assist and supervise the service deliv-
ery of the village clinics.
Figure 1 Major agents and their interactions in the complex adaptive systems framework. The hollow arrows indicate the official passing
on of policies. Linear arrows indicate some consequential interactions or influences. Agents which can be seen as a corporation are rounded by
dashed box.
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ing boundaries in a CASs. For instance, the demanders’
positive feedback had impact on THCs and village clinics
via the mechanism that demanders altered the environ-
ments around the health providers and made the environ-
ments ripe for change. Their trust and payment rendered
health providers receptive to the contract policy and im-
plemented the public health care cooperatively.
In contrast, the agents in county C and D were lack of
incentives to receive any change from the external envi-
ronments. Moreover, centralized control, such as checking
signing rate and imposing a forfeit on village doctors, ser-
iously frustrated health providers and made them resistant
to the contract policy. Health providers learned from the
innovative policy and behaved adaptively to avoid penalty,
for example, some of them used the bogus data to swindle
funding. In general, the development of health assess-
ments and chronic diseases control had no essential differ-
ent with that of county A.
Agents’ mental models and their contexts
The public health systems were embedded in larger
health, economic, historical and political systems of the
society. Apparently, there were little links among all
these coevolving systems. In fact, they had become a lar-
ger context around public health systems which influ-
enced the paths and outcomes of policy implementationthrough shaping agents’ mental models and providing
fresh knowledge for them. That was the reason why
agents in different counties conducted various decisions
and behaviors. The influences in CASs were, of course,
bidirectional between agents and contexts, however this
study just focused on the agents (Figure 1).
County A and B are relatively developed eastern re-
gions. Particularly, county B lies in seaboard having
several harbors. Both of them are well-known for pros-
perous business throughout history. Compared to agents
in other midland counties, health care executants there
had stronger sense of innovation. Furthermore, they pre-
ferred to consider cautiously and predict outcomes prior
to conducting a policy.
County A foresaw a couple of difficulties in the public
health implementation and began to resolve the work-
force shortages by several means. County B provided the
village doctors with the most comprehensive social se-
curity, although its per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) is less than county C. It can be seen that the eco-
nomic status is not the only influencing factor. County B
also applied an audacious way to supplement the fund-
ing for public health, which became the most crucial
incentive mechanism and underpinned the effectiveness
in hypertension and diabetes control.
In addition to influenced by the context, agents in
county B absorbed knowledge from it. The THC managers
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They attracted more population, who were susceptible to
chronic diseases, to listen to the health lectures by means
of distributing little prizes. They realized that imparting
health knowledge to the population between the age of
50 to 65 would have the positive impact on primary pre-
vention and early control of chronic diseases.
“Our lives are teeming with various marketing tools
including doorstep selling, TV advertisement, sending
vouchers and so on. Why our health product cannot
get a finger in the pie? These little prizes such as
washing powder or shampoo can draw more attention
of residents to the public health and make our work
carried out smoothly.” (THC Manager, county B)
County C and D are still in the shadow of the thread-
bare bureaucracy. Their residents take agriculture as
their main source of livelihood. Economics and commu-
nication in mountainous regions are unprosperous even
further. Policy executants and health providers were lack
of service awareness. They pursued more short-term
profit without long-range planning. The request of
signing rate at the beginning of the contract service im-
plementation demonstrated their eagerness to instant
success. There was still sense of hierarchy in people’s
mind, the village doctors were despised by their superior
leaders and received more mandatory orders rather than
instructive incentives. Passive promotion methods were
applied and issues related to village doctors’ livelihood
and rural residents’ right to enjoy public health services
had not been solved yet.
“They (village doctors) are not qualified to be doctors.
Public health services are too difficult for them to
deliver. In fact, our staff undertakes more workload.
We deserve more public health funding than today’s
60%.” (THC Manager, county C)
“Village doctors are always claiming social security.
They are just a group of peasants instead of real
doctors, and they have already made much money by
privately operating the clinics and worn their barefoot
shoes. Whatever else do they want?” (County health
bureau director, county D)
Lessons learnt
Different from former public health studies emphasizing
on a single disease [50,51] or investigating few of prov-
inces, this study unfolded a panorama of public health de-
livery across three provinces, locating from east to west of
China. Although public health care had been funded by
the government for five years, the aims to include the vil-
lage doctors into the government management, effectivelycontrol chronic diseases and protect susceptible popula-
tion, were not realized even under the contract service
policy. Distinctively, county B applied an innovative fund
raising way and partially solved the problem, also made an
initial step toward hypertension and diabetes control. It is
indicated that the contract service is just an auxiliary
means to prompt public health services. The key element
resides in whether the providers and demanders can re-
ceive the benefits from the public health care [35].
High-quality health care in a preferential price for the
demanders, and work incentives for providers (for ex-
ample, to increase the income, complete social security,
and enhance teamwork between different levels) shaped a
virtuous circles and created a more mature context for the
changes to happen in county B. In other counties, the
public health services were in low efficiency whether
the contract program was applied or not. Agents’ resist-
ance and indifference to the public health and contract
service arose the unintended outcomes [33], which should
be avoid in all countries undergoing health reforms by
means of considering the views of all agents [52].
Although there was an argument that the strategies
made by the Ministry of Health had decisive impact on
the health systems’ ability to adapt [53], we found that
the mental models of officials in county health bureaus
were consequential to change the systems. They could
create different contexts for health providers and de-
manders under their jurisdictions. Adjustment of the
contract policy in local level could accelerate the adap-
tion and diffusion of the public health systems [35]. The
mental models of policy executants were not only influ-
enced by the economic status, but also affected by a
mixed effect derived from cultural, historical, political
and socio-economic environments around them [38].
Therefore, it might be unreasonable to expect every local
official can be as audacious, creative and generous as
that of county B. However, their successful experiences
and advanced measures could be extended to other
areas, particular the counties similar to county B in eco-
nomic status and health development. The potential of
NCMS and county finance might be exploited to sup-
port rural health systems.
The contract service policy will soon be implemented
broadly in rural China. More efforts are also in demand
to increase the incentives of both demand and supply
sides, resolve the problems related to workforce short-
ages and the service loophole of the migrant population.
The CASs thinking, for the policymakers and executants
in all levels, is a useful tool to design plans and predict
the unintended outcomes [33,35,54]. Blindly issuing or-
ders and punishing failure will not only waste the health
resources, but also frustrate agents to change, and
ultimately make public health services into a deadlock.
To place emphasis on learning and adjusting policy,
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ripe contexts for agents and making them receptive to
changes, will be more effective models in public health re-
forms, not limited to contract service implementation.Limitations
Our study had certain limitations. We used the purpos-
ive sampling method to select study sites in provincial,
county, township levels rather than the random sam-
pling method. To enhance the sample representative-
ness, we chose them depending on their heterogeneity
in geographical distribution, economic and health devel-
opment. Moreover, the interviewees were chose from mul-
tiple levels ranging from the policy level to the grass-root
unit. The sampling quality was sufficient to hit the target
in this qualitative study. Second, although the non-
participant observation is considered as one of the most
objective and impartial study methods, the observers’
existence might influence agents’ behavior and lead to
the barriers to the acquisition of profound knowledge.
Finally, to comprehensively evaluate the contract service
policy and the effectiveness of public health services,
quantitative researches are demanded to corroborate the
results in the future.Conclusions
The effectiveness of the contract service policy to
prompt public health depends on whether the providers
and demanders can perceive benefits from the public
health services. To supplement the funding for public
health by a small sum of out-of-pocket money from vil-
lagers and the NCMS, provide village doctors with social
security by county finance, could be effective approaches
to include village doctors into the government manage-
ment, promote chronic diseases control and enhance de-
manders’ satisfaction. These measures could serve as a
reference for the relatively developed counties of China
to increase the incentives of agents in the public health
systems. Policymakers and executants could take this
CASs thinking as a useful tool to design plans and pre-
dict the outcomes in public health reforms. After all, the
efficacy and efficiency of the public health services
should be enhanced in most rural areas, and several
problems such as workforce shortages and the migrant
population with the inflexible health funding still need
to be properly resolved.Abbreviations
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